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Abstract
The procompetitive eﬀects of trade policies are analyzed in a foreign duopoly model of vertical
product diﬀerentiation. A uniform tariﬀ policy complying with the Most Favored Nation (MFN)
clause is welfare superior to free trade because of a pure rent-extracting eﬀect. A nonuniform
tariﬀ policy yields an even higher level of social welfare because of procompetitive eﬀects. The
o p t i m a lp o l i c yi ss e n s i t i v et oﬁrms’ cost asymmetries: if these are high, imports of low quality
are subsidized and imports of high quality face a tariﬀ; otherwise, both imports face a tariﬀ.
Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are examples of such nonuniform tariﬀ policies. They yield
higher welfare than free trade because they are procompetitive; moreover, a RTA with a low-
quality producing country yields larger gains than a RTA with a high-quality producing country
because the former enables the importer to extract foreign rents.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The publication of the Boskin report on the upward bias of U.S. inﬂation (Boskin et al., 1996) has
led to renewed research on the impact of product quality on prices and volumes of transactions.
Diﬀerences in product quality are particularly important in international trade where ﬁrms in
developing and transition economies have diﬀerent concerns for quality standards. It is the key
point of Greenaway et al. (1995) who show that intra-industry trade characterized by diﬀerent
levels of quality is a signiﬁcant proportion of trade. Central to the research agenda is the issue
that, if product quality matters, the response of ﬁrms to government policies, and the eﬀects of
such policies on social welfare, can diﬀer markedly from that of received theory. In this regard,
the aim of the paper is to show that welfare-enhancing trade policies also lead to more competitive
equilibria. Because of the procompetitive nature of trade policy in these markets, a Regional
Trading Agreement (RTA) is shown to be welfare superior to free trade and the Most Favored
Nation (MFN) clause.
To model the oligopolistic competition between ﬁr m sw ee m p l o yam o d e lo fv e r t i c a lp r o d u c t
diﬀerentiation. This model captures an important characteristic of oligopolistic ﬁrms namely, that
they select product-design strategies to diﬀerentiate their goods from the rivals prior to the market
competition stage. Also, a number of stylized facts have shaped our framework:
• Surveys such as “The Image of European Products” conducted by the Chambre de Commerce
et d’Industrie de Paris, or others like the Bozall-Gallup Worldwide Quality Poll, give a direct
quality ranking to the goods manufactured in Europe, USA and Japan. Econometric studies
using these surveys establish a tight link between quality and development costs (Crozet and
Erkel-Rousse, 2000).
• Many studies of product introductions in foreign markets associate ﬁrm success with the
understanding of buyer needs abroad (Porter, 1990). Speciﬁc foreign preferences like the
American desire for convenience, the German love for ecology, the Japanese taste for com-
pactness and the Scandinavian concern for safety are determining elements in the design
and sophistication of products like automobiles. Important costs of quality development are
therefore involved and these typically diﬀer across producers. In our model, cost asymme-
tries between foreign ﬁrms enable us to show the existence of a unique reﬁned pure-strategy
equilibrium and do matter for the design of the optimal tariﬀ policy.
2• Many industrialized, transition and developing countries do not produce manufactured goods
like computers, electronics, domestic appliances, cars and trucks, etc. and their demand is
entirely satisﬁed by imports. For example, Fershtman et al. (1999) examine tax reforms in
the automobile market in Israel, a country that does not produce cars and whose demand is
fully satisﬁed by imports.1
• In the last decade more regional trade agreements came into force than ever before (World
Bank, 2000). This trend has continued over the recent past and currently many new initiatives
for special trade agreements are being negotiated within Europe, Asia and the two American
continents. A number of these proposals involve transition and developing countries that
produce goods of distinct qualities. It is therefore important to build a framework than can
examine some welfare aspects of these trade arrangements.
These features are introduced in a third market model where two foreign ﬁrms operating in two
diﬀerent countries export a quality-diﬀerentiated good to the home market which has no domestic
production. Consumers of the importing country have diverse preferences for quality. In order to
meet preferences, ﬁrms incur a ﬁxed cost of quality development. Like in pure vertical diﬀerentiation
models, quality improvements are assumed to fall primarily on ﬁx e dc o s t sa n di n v o l v en oi n c r e a s e
in unit variable cost (Shaked and Sutton, 1983). The active government, located in the importing
country, maximizes domestic welfare by means of ad valorem tariﬀs and/or subsidies.2 We study a
three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the activist government chooses a trade policy against imports
from the two foreign countries. In the second stage, foreign ﬁrms select the qualities to be produced,
and incur the ﬁx e dc o s t s .F i n a l l y ,i nt h et h i r ds t a g e ,ﬁrms indulge in price competition and demand
is satisﬁed. The nature of the game gives a special role to quality which, once set, can be modiﬁed
only in the long-run. In addition, the local government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis foreign
ﬁrms.
In our model a single pure-strategy asymmetric equilibrium arises. In the benchmark free
trade equilibrium, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm produces a low-quality variant while the most eﬃcient ﬁrm
manufactures a high-quality one. We show that national welfare can be increased by levying a
1Though quality diﬀerentials are normally associated with highly technological and industrialized goods, they also
exist among seemingly identical goods like agricultural products, freedom from disease being then one important
aspect of quality. For instance, the European Community is the major destination for the world’s peanut exports
and is the largest consuming region that does not produce them (see, e.g., Raboy and Simpson, 1992).
2It is more and more common for tariﬀs and subsidies to be speciﬁed in ad valorem terms, i.e., as a percentage
of the selling price. The US International Trade Commission has indeed made suggestions to convert most speciﬁc,
compound and complex rates of duty to their ad valorem equivalents (see http://www.usitc.gov).
3tariﬀ on the country producing high quality, or by giving a subsidy to the country producing low
quality. Interestingly, these two policies are procompetitive in the sense that they result in a decline
in the hedonic prices (price-to-quality ratios) of both variants. A subsidy on low-quality imports
results in quality upgrading and price decreases while a tariﬀ on high-quality imports results in
price decreases but in quality downgrading. The optimal trade policy calls for a nonuniform tariﬀ
policy and is sensitive to the extent of cost asymmetries between ﬁrms: when development costs are
not too dissimilar, it consists of imposing a tariﬀ on both types of imports; when cost diﬀerences
are large, welfare is maximized by imposing a tariﬀ on the high-quality producing country and
subsidizing the low-quality producing one. This result leads to a number of new insights:
• In the literature on trade reforms, gains from trade liberalization rely signiﬁcantly on the
procompetitive eﬀects caused by freer trade (Vousden, 1990; Hertel, 1994). In our framework,
it is instead the imposition of an optimal trade policy that enhances social welfare and leads to
a more competitive market equilibrium. The rationale behind this policy is as follows. In the
absence of government intervention, ﬁrms position their products on the quality spectrum
strategically with the aim of reducing competition. By applying the optimal policy, the
activist government aﬀects the relative costs of ﬁrms such that the quality gap between their
products is minimized and thus market competitiveness enhanced. Interestingly, in addition
to extracting rent from foreign ﬁrms, the optimal policy turns out to be procompetitive.
• Our analysis advances a diﬀerent argument in favor of economic integration. The nature of
the optimal trade policy implies that the domestic government has an incentive to deviate
from free trade or from a tariﬀ policy complying with the MFN clause. A possible deviation is
to form a RTA, which is a nonuniform tariﬀ policy because goods imported from the member
country does not face a tariﬀ while similar goods imported from the non-member country
face some tariﬀ. This leads to procompetitive eﬀects and higher welfare compared to free
trade and the MFN clause. The largest welfare improvement is realized when the domestic
economy forms a RTA with a low-quality producing country, which has typically incentives
to join. In this sense, product quality considerations provide support for the membership of
East European countries in the European Union, or the proposal for a Free-Trade Area of
the Americas where NAFTA would be extended southwards.
• Our model addresses a classical question: what is the optimal trade policy of the consuming
nation? In this regard, it extends the literature on trade policy against foreign market power
4(Helpman and Krugman, 1989, ch. 4) to a setting where products are vertically diﬀerentiated.
While in the former literature the optimal policy consists of a positive tariﬀ, in our framework
at a r i ﬀ-cum-subsidy maximizes home country’s welfare when development costs are very
diﬀerent.
The functioning of vertically diﬀerentiated markets has attracted substantial attention in the
Industrial Organization literature.3 The trade literature, besides documenting the importance of
these markets4,h a sf o c u s s e do nt h ei n c i d e n c eo fv a r i o u st r a d ep o l i c i e so nt h eq u a l i t yo fi m p o r t s
and on social welfare under diﬀerent market structures. For example, Herguera et al. (2002) study
the implications of speciﬁc import tariﬀs while Moraga-González and Viaene (2003) examine the
optimal trade and industrial policies of transition economies. Another type of research has examined
the persistence of quality leadership after countries open up to international trade (Motta et al.,
1997). In a third market model, Zhou et al. (2002) analyze the robustness of the proﬁt-shifting
argument in the presence of vertical product diﬀerentiation.5 The latter analysis is the closest to
ours but diﬀers in a number of ways. First, while they focus on the strategic use of export subsidies
by two policymakers, we examine a framework where the importing country is the sole policymaker.
This distinction is important because while the strategic proﬁt-shifting argument is central to their
model it plays no role in our framework. Second, while they examine the interaction between
developing and developed countries by assuming very large cost asymmetries between ﬁrms, we
also allow for low cost asymmetries. This distinction matters because trade policies are sensitive to
the extent of cost asymmetries and can induce ﬁrms to leapfrog each other on the quality ladder.
This possibility is excluded by assumption in Zhou et al. (2002).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model.
Section 3 derives the ﬁrms’ optimum and the market equilibrium. Section 4 selects the optimal
trade policy. Section 5 evaluates alternative trade policy regimes such as RTAs. Finally, Section 6
discusses the results and the Appendix contains the proofs.
3See, e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983; Motta, 1993;
Cremer and Thisse, 1994; Lehman-Grube, 1997; Ronnen, 1991; Crampes and Hollander, 1995.
4See, e.g., Feenstra, 1988; Greenaway et al., 1995; Fontagné et al., 1998; Anderton, 1999.
5The literature also includes Krishna (1987, 1990), Das and Donnenfeld (1987) who study tariﬀs and quotas under
monopoly. In a duopoly consisting of a domestic and a foreign ﬁrm, Das and Donnenfeld (1989), Ries (1993) and
Herguera et al. (2000) analyze the eﬀects of quantity and quality restrictions.
52T h e M o d e l
We examine an international duopoly model of vertical product diﬀerentiation with asymmetric
costs. Suppose that a population of measure 1 lives in the importing country, which we shall also
refer to as the domestic economy. Preferences of consumer θ are given by the quasi-linear (indirect)
utility function: U = θq − p, if he buys a unit of a good of quality q at price p, and 0 otherwise.
Consumers buy at most one unit. Suppose that the consumer-speciﬁcq u a l i t yt a s t ep a r a m e t e rθ is
uniformly distributed over [0,θ], θ>0.
There are two ﬁrms located in two diﬀerent countries which produce and export the good in
question. Both ﬁrms and respective countries are indexed i =1 ,2. Firms must incur the ﬁxed
cost of quality development Ci(q)=ciq2/2,i=1 ,2. Suppose that c1 >c 2, i.e., foreign ﬁrms are
asymmetric regarding their setup technologies. Once the quality of the good is determined, we
assume that production takes place at a common marginal cost which is normalized to zero.6
We study a complete information three-stage game. First, the domestic government acts as a
Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis foreign ﬁr m sa n dc h o o s e sat a r i ﬀ (subsidy) policy (t1,t 2) on imports
to maximize national welfare, where ti is the ad valorem tariﬀ (subsidy) levied on imports from
country i =1 ,2.7 Foreign ﬁrms act as followers and thus take tariﬀsa sg i v e n .I nt h es e c o n ds t a g e
of the game, foreign ﬁrms choose the qualities to produce, and incur the ﬁxed costs. Finally, in the
third stage, ﬁrms indulge in price competition and demand is satisﬁed. The appropriate solution
concept is subgame perfect equilibrium. The model is solved by backward induction.8
6The speciﬁcation of the cost function could be more general without aﬀecting results qualitatively. For example,
Moraga-González and Viaene (2003) use cost functions with a degree of homogeneity k ≥ 2 in qualities. While larger
k values aﬀect results quantitatively they do not alter them qualitatively.
7This timing of moves assumes that the government can credibly commit to a certain trade policy. According
to Brander (1995) most international trade observers agree in that governments often possess credible commitment
devices. For example, when tariﬀ rates are set after negotiations among several parties, they usually remain ﬁxed
until the next round of negotiations. However, another literature on time-consistent strategic trade policy has pointed
out that policy may be sensitive to the diﬀerent assumptions about government precommitment (see e.g. Goldberg,
1995 and Leahy and Neary, 1999). In our model, in absence of commitment, the government would simply maximize
revenues and ﬁrms would respond by not entering the market; this implies that the government must commit to its
trade policy for the market to exist.
8We are ignoring the possibility that foreign governments engage in retaliatory trade policies (Collie, 1991; Bagwell
and Staiger, 1999). The rationale behind this assumption is that international ﬁrms often serve many markets and
this impedes foreign governments to target retaliations against a speciﬁcc o u n t r y . A na n a l y s i so fat h r e e - p l a y e r
retaliatory game like the one that would arise in our setting involves major diﬃculties, among them the fact that the
strategy of one of the players (domestic government) is two-dimensional.
63 Market Equilibrium
We ﬁrst derive the equilibrium outcome of the price competition stage. To do so, we ﬁrst present
the demands faced by the two foreign ﬁrms. Heterogeneity in consumer tastes implies that it is
optimal for the two ﬁrms to diﬀerentiate their goods by choosing diﬀerent quality levels. Let us
denote high-quality by qh and low-quality by ql, qh ≥ ql. Suppose also, for the moment, that ph ≥ pl,
that is the ﬁrm producing a higher quality charges a higher price.9 To obtain domestic demands for
the two qualities, denote by e θ the consumer who is indiﬀerent between purchasing the two varieties.
From the utility function, e θ =( ph−pl)/(qh−ql). Deﬁne now b θ as the consumer indiﬀerent between
acquiring the low-quality good and nothing at all, i.e., b θ = pl/ql. Ac o n s u m e rθ buys high quality











Firm 1 might in principle choose to produce a variant whose quality is either lower or higher
than that of the competitor. Assume, for the moment, that ﬁrm 1 produces low quality. Taking
the pair of demands in (1), the pair of tariﬀ rates (t1, t2) and quality choices (qh, ql) as given, the
problem of ﬁrm 1 consists of ﬁnding pl so as to maximize π1 =( 1−t1)plDl(.)−c1q2
l /2. On the other
hand, the rival ﬁrm chooses ph to maximize its proﬁts π2 =( 1− t2)phDh(.) − c2q2
h/2. Solving the








A number of observations are in line here. First, notice that ph/qh ≥ pl/ql. Therefore, in
equilibrium, the hedonic price of the high-quality good is higher than that of the low-quality one.
Second, observe that prices do not directly depend on tariﬀ rates or development costs. However,
as we shall see, they will do so indirectly, via ﬁrms’ quality selection qh and ql.
Consider now stage two where ﬁrms select qualities. In this stage, ﬁrms take (t1,t 2) as given,
anticipate the equilibrium prices of the continuation game given in (2), and choose their qualities
to maximize proﬁts. In particular, ﬁrm 1 chooses ql to maximize:
π1 =( 1− t1)







9We check below that this is actually satisﬁed in the equilibrium of the subgame.
7Likewise, ﬁrm 2 selects qh to maximize:
π2 =( 1− t2)







Since qh ≥ ql, we can deﬁne µ = qh/ql,µ≥ 1. Variable µ represents the quality gap between ﬁrms.
It measures the degree of product diﬀerentiation and, as we shall see, it relates to the extent of






4(4µ2 − 3µ +2 )
. (3)
This equation gives the equilibrium product diﬀerentiation µ as an implicit function of relative
costs and ad valorem tariﬀs. There exists a unique real solution to this third degree polynomial for
any parametrical point (c1,c 2,t 1,t 2) which satisﬁes µ>1.75. The next lemma shows the response
of µ to changes in the primitive parameters of the model c1 and c2, and in the policy variables t1
and t2.
Lemma 1 Quality gap µ increases in ﬁrms’ relative development costs c1/c2. Moreover, it increases
in t1 and decreases in t2.
Since equilibrium µ is obtained from (3), it is now straightforward to solve for equilibrium















ql =( 1− t1)
θµ2(4µ − 7)
c1 (4µ − 1)
3 (6)
qh =( 1− t2)
4θµ(4µ2 − 3µ +2 )
c2 (4µ − 1)
3 (7)
Equation (3) together with (4) to (7) characterize the market equilibrium obtained from stages
2 and 3 of our game. The variable µ is central to our analysis. To see why, take the ratio of domestic
prices in (5): ph/pl =2 µ. The variable µ is therefore a measure of domestic price competition among
the two ﬁrms: an increase in µ relaxes price competition and price diﬀerences rise. Moreover, both
hedonic prices ph/qh and pl/ql, which are obtained from (5), increase in µ. On this basis, we shall
8refer to a trade policy that leads to a decrease in µ as procompetitive. Vice versa, a policy that
increases µ is called anti-competitive. We also observe from (4) that the relationship between µ and
the quantities sold is negative. This is because, as the quality gap widens, higher prices lead to a
r e d u c t i o ni nd e m a n d s .
So far we have assumed that ﬁrm 1 produces low quality and ﬁrm 2 high quality. However, it
may very well be that ﬁrm 1 produces high quality instead. The next result states the conditions
under which the ﬁrst assignment in qualities is the unique equilibrium of the subgame analyzed
above.
Lemma 2 If c1(1−t2)/(1−t1) >c 2, ﬁrm 1 produces low quality and ﬁr m2h i g hq u a l i t yi nt h eu n i q u e
equilibrium of the continuation game. If c1(1 − t2)/(1 − t1) <c 2, ﬁr m1p r o d u c e sh i g hq u a l i t ya n d
ﬁrm 2 low quality in the unique equilibrium of the continuation game. When c1(1−t2)/(1−t1)=c2,
ﬁrm 1 may produce either high or low quality.
The proof is available from the authors upon request.10 We simply provide here a sketch of
the proof. First, we show that when c2 is suﬃciently low compared to c1(1 − t2)/(1 − t1),t h e
assignment in which the high quality is produced by ﬁrm 1 and low quality is produced by ﬁrm 2 is
not subgame perfect because the latter ﬁrm, which is highly eﬃcient, ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate
and leapfrog the former ﬁrm. However, when the cost asymmetry between the ﬁr m si ss m a l l ,t h e
proof uses the risk-dominance criterion of Harsany and Selten (1988). This reﬁnement selects away
the equilibrium in which ﬁrm 1 produces high quality whenever c1(1−t2)/(1−t1) >c 2, i.e., as long
as ﬁrm 2 is more eﬃcient than ﬁrm 1 in relative terms. Since c1 >c 2, this condition is trivially
satisﬁed for t1 = t2. We shall later show that the optimal tariﬀ policy, though nonuniform, satisﬁes
this inequality as well. In the case that c1(1−t2)/(1−t1)=c2, the equilibrium selection reﬁnement
has no bite and both assignments can be equilibria.
4 Trade Policy
Finally, in the ﬁrst stage of the game, the domestic government chooses the optimal tariﬀ policy that
maximizes domestic social welfare. We assume that the proceeds obtained from import taxation are
uniformly distributed among the consumers. Therefore social welfare equals the (unweighted) sum
10It can also be downloaded from http://www.tinbergen.nl/~moraga.
9of domestic consumer surplus and tariﬀ revenues,11 i.e., W = S+t1plDl(.)+t2phDh(.). Consumers











Employing (5), (6), and (7), consumers surplus can be conveniently written as:
S =
θµ2(4µ +5 ) ql
2(4µ − 1)2 (8)
where µ is given by (3) and ql by (6). On the other hand, tariﬀs revenues obtained from imports








Using the previous expressions we can write the social welfare function of the domestic economy
as:
W(t1,t 2;c1,c 2)=A(µ(t1,t 2),t 1,t 2) ∗ ql(µ(t1,t 2),t 1) (10)
where A(.)=θ[µ2(4µ +5 ) /2+t1µ(µ − 1) + 4t2µ2(µ − 1)]/(4µ − 1)2 and ql is given by (6).
Let us now examine the eﬀects of trade policy on the domestic economy in the benchmark case
of free trade. Using Lemma 2, we know that low quality is produced in country 1 while high quality
is produced in country 2. We ﬁrst consider the cases of uniform and nonuniform tariﬀsa n dt h e n
derive the optimal policy.
Uniform Tariﬀ Policy
With uniform tariﬀs, the active government levies a common tariﬀ on imports from countries 1 and
2, that is, it sets t1 = t2 = t>0. From (3) it is clear that the quality gap µ remains unaltered after
this policy change. This enables us to state the following result:
Proposition 1 Starting from free trade, a small uniform tariﬀ on all imports results in (i) a
downgrade in the quality of all imports, (ii) a decrease in the domestic price of the goods, (iii) a
decrease in consumer surplus, and (iv) an increase in social welfare. Consequently, free trade is
not optimal.
11Note that, in line with the observation above and to economize on space, we only write down here the social
welfare expression corresponding to the case where ﬁrm 1 produces low quality (see the proof of Proposition 3 below
for the case where ﬁrm 1 produces high quality instead).
10Proposition 1 indicates that a small uniform tariﬀ against foreign ﬁrms is welfare enhancing. A
tariﬀ is attractive here due to a rent-extraction eﬀect,12 that is, income is taken away from foreign
ﬁrms and transferred to local consumers to compensate them for the loss in consumer surplus that
is caused by the downgrade in the quality of imports. We note that a uniform tariﬀ policy does
not change the competitive conditions in the local market because the quality gap between imports
of the two countries remains unaltered.13
Nonuniform Tariﬀs
When tariﬀs are nonuniform the government imposes distinct tariﬀs on imports proceeding from
diﬀerent countries. As Lemma 1 shows, a nonuniform trade policy alters the equilibrium quality
gap. Thus, besides extracting rents from foreign ﬁrms, a nonuniform tariﬀ modiﬁes the degree of
local price competition between ﬁrms. Starting from free trade, the impact of a nonuniform tariﬀ
policy on our equilibrium is:
Proposition 2 (i) Starting from free trade, a small tariﬀ on country 1 where the low-quality
variant is produced is anti-competitive and leads to: (a) a downgrade in the quality of both variants,
(b) an increase in the price of the high-quality product, (c) a reduction in the price of the low-
quality good, (d) a reduction in the quantities sold and in the number of consumers being served,
(e) a reduction in consumer surplus and (f) a decrease in social welfare.
(ii) Starting from free trade, a small tariﬀ on country 2 where the high-quality variant is produced
is procompetitive and leads to: (a) a downgrade in the quality and price of both variants and (b)
an increase in the quantities sold and in the number of consumers being served, (c) a decrease in
consumer surplus and (d) an increase in social welfare.
Proposition 2 shows that the eﬀects of an asymmetric tariﬀ policy are sensitive to whether the
low-quality or the high-quality ﬁrm is conferred a cost advantage as a result of the tariﬀ.B o t h
policies downgrade qualities, which tends to reduce consumer surplus in either case. However, a
tariﬀ on the low-quality producing country has two additional pervasive eﬀects on welfare: price
competition between the ﬁr m si sr e l a x e d( w h i c hr e s u l t si na ni n c r e a s ei nph), and the number of
12This is in line with Brander and Spencer (1981) and Helpman and Krugman (1989, ch. 4), who analyze a
homogeneous product market.
13Since the intensity of competition does not change with a uniform tariﬀ in our setting, this intervention leads
to eﬀects similar to those under monopoly (Krishna, 1987; Das and Donnenfeld, 1987). However, as we shall see,
non-uniform tariﬀs can be designed to be either procompetitive or anti-competitive and therefore their implications
will diﬀer substantially from the monopoly settings of the earlier literature.
11consumers served falls. As tariﬀ revenues are small, a tariﬀ on the low-quality good ends up being
welfare retarding. By contrast, a tariﬀ on the high-quality ﬁrm fosters competition between ﬁrms
(which results in lower equilibrium prices of both variants) and increases market size. Though the
overall impact of a tariﬀ on high quality is a fall in consumer surplus, tariﬀ revenues more than
oﬀset this loss and welfare rises. In summary, a tariﬀ levied on the imports from country 2 functions
as a procompetitive device because hedonic prices fall; by contrast, a tariﬀ levied on the imports
proceeding from country 1 is anti-competitive.
It is important to note that Proposition 2 also applies to the case where comparative statics is
performed around uniform trade policies other than free trade.
Optimal Trade Policy
The preceding results indicate that there exist incentives for the activist government to deviate
from free trade or from the MFN principle and apply a nonuniform tariﬀ policy. The reason for
this is that a ﬁnely tuned nonuniform tariﬀ is a procompetitive policy, thus yielding higher welfare
gains for the domestic country.14 The next result describes the nature of the socially optimal trade
policy.
Proposition 3 The optimal trade policy is such that: (i) It satisﬁes c1(1 − t2)/(1 − t1) >c 2,
which implies that ﬁrm 1 produces low quality and ﬁrm 2 produces high quality; (ii) It consists of a
tariﬀ on country 2 and a tariﬀ (subsidy) on country 1 when cost asymmetries are suﬃciently small
(large).
The nature of the optimal trade policy can be explained as follows. Under free trade or under the
MFN clause, ﬁrms choose ‘extremes’ in the quality spectrum aiming at reducing price competition.
In contrast, by imposing the optimal tariﬀ policy, the government tries to combine the beneﬁcial
procompetitive eﬀects of a tariﬀ on high quality and a subsidy on low quality (Proposition 2). As
a result, the optimal policy tends to minimize the quality gap and thus is strongly procompetitive.
The welfare consequences of this policy can be seen in Figure 1, which also reproduces the welfare
levels achieved under free trade and under the MFN clause.
14In the present context, an interesting way to impose a nonuniform tariﬀ policy is to include two distinct entries for
t h eg o o di nq u e s t i o n ,o n ew h i c hs p e c i ﬁes the characteristics of the low-quality variant, the other for the high-quality
one. A typical example of such a policy is the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Under this scheme, the
President of the United States may give a preferential duty lower than the existing tariﬀ to a particular country
and therefore subdivides this tariﬀ line to accomplish the desired treatment. As a favorable treatment is often given
to developing and transition economies which are typical producers of low-quality products, our analysis hints at
potential positive welfare eﬀects of the GSP.
12The optimal policy complying with the MFN clause is derived by maximizing social welfare
(10) under the constraint t1 = t2 = t. For any c1/c2, under the MFN principle, ﬁrms are taxed at







2(µ − 1)(4µ +1 )
¸
(11)
where µ is the solution to (3). It is clear from (11) that the MFN clause tariﬀ increases with
the quality gap µ but is bounded below 0.25. Moreover, since by Lemma 1 product diﬀerentiation
increases in c1/c2, it follows that the MFN clause tariﬀ increases in cost asymmetries as well.
In Figure 1, for any c1/c2, the vertical distance between WMFN and WFT represents the pure
rent-extracting eﬀect of the MFN policy shown in Proposition 1. By contrast, the distance between
WOPT and WMFN shows the additional gains obtained by enhancing price competition between
ﬁrms in the domestic market.












Figure 1: The optimal trade policy
5 Regional Trade Agreements
Figure 1 illustrates that the activist government has incentives to deviate from the MFN principle.
RTAs, formally approved by the WTO, are possible deviations from the MFN policy and approx-
imate the nature of the optimal trade policy. Our framework is thus suitable to examine some
welfare aspects of these trade agreements.
The principal feature of RTAs is the discriminatory treatment which favors members relative
to non-members: goods imported from member countries face a zero tariﬀ while similar goods
imported from non-member countries face a tariﬀ distinct from zero. In our model, consider the
13case where the domestic authority desires to form a RTA with one of the two foreign countries.15
Then:
Proposition 4 As compared to free trade, a Regional Trade Agreement with either of the countries
is welfare improving.
As the proof of this result follows directly from Proposition 2, we give an intuitive reasoning
instead. The main reason why these agreements are welfare improving is because they contribute
to enhance competition more than free trade. Consider the two possible trade agreements of our
framework, both leading to a decrease in the quality gap and thus to an increase in price competition
and welfare: (a)az e r ot a r i ﬀ on high-quality imports from country 2 together with a subsidy on
low-quality imports from country 1, or (b)az e r ot a r i ﬀ on low-quality imports from country 1
together with a positive tariﬀ on high-quality imports from country 2. Given this, the question
that arises is: which of the two trade agreements does yield the highest welfare gains? We ﬁnd
that the RTA with the low-quality producing country is always welfare superior to the alternative
trade agreement. This is illustrated in Figure 2, where the maximum welfare levels obtained under
a RTA with the high-quality producing country (WRTA2) are compared with those under a RTA
with the low-quality producing country (WRTA1). These are the highest welfare levels than can be
obtained in each case; for example, we calculate the welfare level in the case of a RTA with country
1 by maximizing the social welfare function (10) with respect to t2 subject to the constraints t1 =0
and c1(1 − t2) ≥ c2 (Lemma 2).
It is clear from Figure 2 that higher welfare gains are obtained under a RTA with country 1
than under a RTA with country 2. The former agreement extracts rents from country 2 through a
tariﬀ and, in addition, is procompetitive. The latter agreement is also procompetitive but does not
extract foreign rent. For the sake of ranking tariﬀ policies, the graph also reproduces the welfare
levels achieved under free trade, the MFN clause and the optimal policy. It reveals than a RTA
with country 1 does better than the MFN clause for the majority of the cost parameters. This
highlights the importance of the procompetitive eﬀect associated to this trade agreement.
15In our model, a RTA with both countries is nothing else than free trade.















Figure 2: Regional trade agreements
The question that arises now is whether the low-quality producing country beneﬁts from a
regional trade agreement. It is easy to show that the answer to this question depends on the initial
tariﬀ policy. Interestingly, starting from the MFN clause, a RTA leads to higher proﬁts for the
low-quality ﬁrm and therefore gives incentives for this country to sign the agreement. However,
this might not be the case if one starts from, for example, free trade or the optimal policy. In those
cases liberalization in other areas might be needed to reach an agreement; in this connection, it
is interesting to observe that regional trade agreements seldom address only trade barriers. For
example, Ethier (1998) argues that regional trade agreements give newcomers a marginal advantage
compared to non-participating countries in attracting foreign direct investments, which then give
access to a larger market.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has considered the procompetitive eﬀects of tariﬀ policies in a context where products
contain diﬀerent quality attributes and where domestic demand is met by imports from two foreign
ﬁrms located in two diﬀerent countries. We have argued that a single reﬁned pure-strategy asym-
metric equilibrium arises whenever consumers have heterogenous tastes on quality. While prior
research has indicated how social welfare can be improved by altering quality through taxation in
monopoly settings, our analysis has reﬁned the discussion by identifying the pro- or anti-competitive
nature of trade policy and determining the optimal tariﬀ policy in the set of alternatives under
15oligopoly. The existence of distinct qualities gives rise to an optimal policy consisting of setting a
nonuniform tariﬀ policy. The optimal policy is sensitive to ﬁrms’ cost asymmetries: if these are
high, imports of low quality are subsidized and imports of high quality face a tariﬀ;o t h e r w i s e ,
both imports face a tariﬀ. This policy is more attractive than, for example, a MFN clause because,
besides extracting rents, it fosters competition between the ﬁrms in the domestic market.
Alternatively, the government may consider the formation of a regional trade agreement. In
this regard, our theory shows that RTAs are welfare superior to free trade because ﬁrms end up
competing more aggressively. The largest gains are obtained when the domestic country joins the
low-quality producing country. Moreover, the latter has typically an incentive to join.
167 Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : Consider the functions g1(t1,t 2,c 1,c 2)=c1(1 − t2)/c2(1 − t1) and g2(µ)=
µ2(4µ − 7)/(4(4µ2 − 3µ +2 ) ) . Note that dg1/dt1 = c1(1 − t2)/c2(1 − t1)2 > 0,d g 1/dt2 = −c1/(1 −
t1)c2 < 0 and dg2/dµ = µ(16µ3 − 24µ2 +4 5 µ − 28)/4
¡
4µ2 − 3µ +2
¢2 > 0. Therefore, as (3) must
be satisﬁed in equilibrium, holding t2 constant, µ increases as t1 increases. Holding t1 constant, µ
decreases as t2 increases. Likewise, we can show that µ increases with c1/c2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :S i n c eµ is insensitive to t, statements (i)a n d( ii) follow directly from
inspection of equations (5), (6) and (7). Since ql falls, observation of (8) reveals that consumer
surplus declines, which proves (iii). Since consumer welfare decreases with the tariﬀ,t h i si n t e r v e n -
tion can only be socially desirable if and only if it allows government to extract a suﬃciently large







+ t(µ − 1)(1 + 4µ)
¸
(12)


















+( 1− 2t)(µ − 1)(4µ +1 )
¸
(13)
The sign of dW/dt depends on the sign of the expression in square brackets. In a neighborhood of
free trade (t =0 ) , we have sign{dW/dt|t=0} = sign{2µ2−5.5µ−1} > 0 for all µ>3. We now note
that since c1 >c 2 and tariﬀ rates are equal, the solution in (3) is bounded above 5. To see this,
note that the RHS of (3) is increasing in µ, while its LHS is constant; therefore, the lowest value
of µ solving (3) obtains when c1 ' c2. In such a case, µ is approximately equal to 5.25123 > 5.
Therefore, it follows that dW/dt|t=0 > 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :(i) First, notice that by Lemma 1, ∂µ/∂t1 > 0. (a) Note that dqh/dt1 =
(∂qh/∂µ)(∂µ/∂t1). From (7) we have ∂qh/∂µ = −(1 − t2)8θ(5µ +1 ) /c2 (4µ − 1)
4 < 0. Thus,
dqh/dt1 < 0. Since ql = qh/µ, and qh falls while µ increases with t1, then dql/dt1 < 0. (b)U s i n g
(7) and (5), we can rewrite ph =( 1 − t2)8θ
2µ(µ − 1)(4µ2 − 3µ +2 ) /c2(4µ − 1)4. Note that
dph/dt1 =( ∂ph/∂µ)(∂µ/∂t1). Since ∂ph/∂µ =( 1−th)8θ
2(12µ3−19µ2+14µ+2)/c2 (4µ − 1)
5 > 0,
it follows that dph/dt1 > 0.( c)F r o m( 5 )w eh a v epl = ph/2µ. Then, pl = θ(µ − 1)qh/µ(4µ − 1).
Observe that θ(µ−1)/µ(4µ−1) decreases with µ ≥ 5.25123, and so with t1. Note also that qh falls
17with t1. Thus, dpl/dt1 < 0. (d) This follows from the fact that dDi/dµ < 0,i=1 ,2 (see equation
(4)). (e) Consumer surplus can be written as S = θµ(4µ+5)qh/2(4µ−1)2. It can be seen that both
factors θµ(4µ+5)/2(4µ−1)2 and qh fall with µ. Therefore dS/dt1 < 0. (f ) Using (8), (9) and (6), the
relevant expression of social welfare is W = θ
2µ3(4µ−7)(1−t1)(µ(4µ+5)+2t1(µ−1))/2c1(4µ−1)2.
We need the sign of
dW
dt1






















2µ3(4µ − 7)(4µ2 +3 µ +2 )
2c1(4µ − 1)5 < 0
∂W
∂µ




2µ3(16µ3 − 24µ2 +4 5 µ +3 5 )
c1(4µ − 1)6 > 0
From equation (3) we have that
∂µ
∂t1




4c1(16µ3 − 24µ2 +4 5 µ − 28)
> 0.
Using again (3) to substitute c2/c1 in this expression, yields
∂µ
∂t1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
t1=0
=
µ(4µ − 7)(4µ2 − 3µ +2 )
16µ3 − 24µ2 +4 5 µ − 28
> 0.
Now we are ready to compute the total derivative
dW
dt1




2µ3(4µ − 7)(128µ6 +3 2 µ5 +4 0 µ4 − 154µ3 +7 9 µ2 − 370µ +5 6 )
c1(4µ − 1)5(128µ4 − 224µ3 +4 0 8 µ2 − 314µ +5 6 )
< 0.
This completes the proof of (i). The proof of (ii) is analogous and omitted to save space.
Proof of Proposition 3: An element of complication that arises in the study of the optimal trade
policy is that, since the government moves ﬁrst in the game, he must anticipate the equilibrium
of the continuation game. As noted in Lemma 2, ﬁrm 1 produces low quality in the unique
equilibrium of the subsequent game if and only if the government chooses a tariﬀ policy such
that c1(1 − t2)/(1 − t1) >c 2. We shall show that this is indeed the case, which means that the
government has no interest in inducing the most ineﬃcient ﬁrm to produce high quality. The proof
proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst study the problem of choosing the best tariﬀ policy for the market
conﬁguration where ﬁrm 1 produces low quality and ﬁrm 2 high quality. Second, we compute the
18best tariﬀsa g a i n s tﬁrm 1 producing high quality and ﬁrm 2 low quality. We ﬁnally compare the
welfare levels attained under these two alternative scenarios and the result follows.
For any c1 and c2, let us deﬁne Wj(t1,t 2),j=1 ,2 as the social welfare under any pol-
icy mix (t1,t 2) in Assignment j.D e n o t e b y (t∗
1,t ∗
2) the maximizer of W1(t1,t 2), i.e., (t∗
1,t ∗
2)=
argmaxW1(t1,t 2) subject to c2 ≤ c1(1 − t2)/(1 − t1). Likewise, let (t1, t2)=a r g m a x W2(t1,t 2)
subject to c2 ≥ c1(1 − t2)/(1 − t1). Hence W1(t∗
1,t ∗
2) and W2(t1,t2) denote the maximum level of
welfare attained under Assignments 1 and 2, respectively.
As noted above, ﬁnding (t∗
1,t ∗
2) consists of maximizing (10) subject to the constraint that c1(1−







µθ(1 − t1)(µ − 1)









4µ2θ(1 − t2)(µ − 1)
A(.)(4µ − 1)2 − αβ
¸
. (15)
The explicit values of α and β are cumbersome and therefore omitted. From (14) we have:
αβ =1−
θ(1 − t1)µ(µ − 1)
A(.)(4µ − 1)2
This expression together with (15) gives the relation
A(.)(4µ − 1)2 − θ(1 − t1)µ(µ − 1) = 4θ(1 − t2)µ2(µ − 1)
Using the expression for A(·) given above, this equation reduces to:
16t2µ(µ − 1) + 4t1(µ − 1) = µ(4µ − 11) − 2.










This equation gives the relationship between t1 and t2. From (16) it follows that t2 > 0 if and only if
t1 <
¡
4µ2 − 11µ − 2
¢
/4(µ−1). Since t1 ≤ 1, it suﬃces to show that
¡
4µ2 − 11µ − 2
¢
/4(µ−1) > 1,
which holds if and only if 4µ2 −15µ+2> 0. This last inequality is satisﬁed for all µ>4; since we
are assuming that c1(1 − t2)/(1 − t1) >c 2, any solution to (3) satisﬁes µ>5. Therefore t2 > 0.
To show that t1 can be positive or negative depending on parameters, we note that when cost
19asymmetries are very small, i.e., c1 ' c2, then it is necessarily the case that t1 ' t2 (otherwise the
constraint c1(1 − t2)/(1 − t1) >c 2 would be violated). The numerical analysis we have conducted
reveals that when cost asymmetries are very large, this constraint is not binding and then it is the
case that ﬁrm 1 is subsidized.
Assume now the contrary, i.e., that the government tariﬀ policy is some (t1,t 2) satisfying
c1(1 − t2)/(1 − t1) <c 2. Then, as noted in Lemma 2, the unique equilibrium of the continuation
game is such that high quality is produced in country 1 and low quality in country 2. In such a case,
the equilibrium product diﬀerentiation is given by e µ solution to (18) and the qualities produced by
ﬁrm 1 and 2 are given in (19) and (20), respectively. Welfare is given by
W2(t1,t 2)=
θ
(4e µ − 1)2
·
e µ2(4e µ +5 )
2
+ t2e µ(e µ − 1) + 4t1e µ2(e µ − 1)
¸
e ql.
As deﬁned above, (t1,t2) = argmaxW2(t1,t 2). Unfortunately, W1(t∗
1,t ∗
2) cannot be explicitly com-
pared with W2(t1,t2). Thus, we have chosen to numerically solve the model for diﬀerent cost
parameters. In Figure 3 we have represented W1(t∗
1,t ∗
2) and W2(t1,t2).

















It is clear that the government has no interest in choosing a tariﬀ policy so that ﬁrm 1 produces
high quality and ﬁrm 2 low quality. We conclude that c1(1 − t2)/(1 − t1) >c 2 holds.
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P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : For any given pair of tariﬀs (t1,t 2), there may potentially be two equilibrium
quality conﬁgurations in our continuation game. In the ﬁrst equilibrium candidate, low quality is
produced by ﬁrm 1, while in the second low quality is produced by ﬁrm 2. We shall refer to the
ﬁrst quality conﬁguration as Assignment 1, and to the second as Assignment 2.
In the ﬁrst case, µ is the solution to the equation µ2(4µ − 7)/4(4µ2 − 3µ +2 )=k1, where
k1 = c1(1 − t2)/c2(1 − t1) > 0. Denote this solution as µ1. In the second case, µ is the solution to
µ2(4µ − 7)/4(4µ2 − 3µ +2 )=k2, with k2 = c2(1 − t1)/c1(1 − t2). Denote this solution as µ2. In
addition, we deﬁne
f(x)=
4x2 − 3x +2
(4x − 1)3 and g(x)=
x3(4x − 7)
4(4x − 1)3,
with f0(x) < 0,f 00(x) > 0,g 0(x) > 0, and g00(x) < 0 for all x ≥ 7/4.
We ﬁrst we study the conditions under which Assignment 1 is an equilibrium. To do so, we
prove that both ﬁrms’ proﬁts at the proposed equilibrium are non-negative and that no ﬁrm has





1 − 3µ1 +2 )
2c1(4µ1 − 1)6 and π2,h =
16c1(1 − t2)2
c2(1 − t1)2 π1,l. (17)
It is easy to check that µ0
1(k1) > 0; then, in equilibrium, for any parametrical constellation, it must
be the case that µ1 ≥ 7/4=1 .75. This actually implies that ql and qh are positive and that ﬁrms’
beneﬁts are non-negative.
We now check the conditions under which no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate by leapfrogging the
rival’s choice. The case of “downward” leapfrogging only makes sense if selling a low-quality good
generates higher proﬁts than a high-quality good, which is not the case here. There is, however,
potential for “upward” leapfrogging. Suppose ﬁrm 1 deviates by leapfrogging its rival. In such a
case, ﬁrm 1 would select q ≥ qh to maximize deviating proﬁts:
e π1,h =( 1− t1)
4θq2(q − qh)
(4q − qh)2 −
c1q2
2
1The ﬁrst order condition is:
(1 − t1)
4θq(4q2 − 3qqh +2 q2
h)
(4q − qh)3 − c1q =0
Deﬁne λ ≥ 1 such that q = λqh = λµ1ql. Then, we can write:
q =( 1− t1)
4θλ(4λ2 − 3λ +2 )
c1(4λ − 1)3 = λqh = λ(1 − t1)
4θµ1(4µ2
1 − 3µ1 +2 )
c2 (4µ1 − 1)
3
From this equality, we obtain that λ must satisfy:
(4λ2 − 3λ +2 )
(4λ − 1)3 =
(4µ2






i.e., f(λ)=f(µ1)µ1c1/c2. Denote the solution to this equation as λ1. Since µ1c1/c2 > 1 and
f0(·) < 0, it follows λ1 <µ 1. Moreover, the larger c1/c2, the greater is µ1c1/c2 and the larger the
diﬀerence between λ1 and µ1.
We can now compare deviating proﬁts e π1,h with those at the proposed equilibrium π1,l.D e v i -
ating proﬁt sc a nb ew r i t t e na s :





x3(4x − 7)(4x2 − 3x +2 )
¢
/(4x − 1)6, and h0(x) > 0. Equilibrium proﬁts are:
π1,h =( 1− t1)2θ
2h(µ1)
2c1






Firm 1 does not deviate whenever e π1,h ≤ π1,l, i.e., if and only if 16h(λ1) ≤ h(µ1). Since as c1/c2
increases µ1 increases while λ1 decreases, it is clear that there exists some critical level of c1/c2 for
which the inequality above holds and ﬁrm 1 has no interest in deviating. To complete the proof
we need to show that the parametrical space for which the equations above have real well-deﬁned
solutions and the above inequality is fulﬁlled is not empty. We prove this by providing an example.
First, note that equation (3) is cubic in µ a n dt h a ti t sR H Si n c r e a s e si nµ. Therefore, since any valid
set of parameters (c1,c 2,t 1,t 2) satisﬁes
ci(1−tj)
cj(1−ti) > 0,i ,j=1 ,2,i6= j, there is always a real solution
2to (3) satisfying µ ≥ 1.75. Notice now that there also exists a solution to equation f(λ)−kg(µ)=0 ,
which is also cubic in λ, a n dc a nb ew r i t t e na s(4λ2 −3λ+2 )/kg(µ)=( 4 λ−1)3. Since the LHS is
ever positive, the solution satisﬁes λ ≥ 1, as required. It can be shown that primitive parameters
exist for which Assignment 1 is an equilibrium of the continuation game. Suppose c1 =1 .1 and
c2 =1and a MFN clause tariﬀ policy (t1 = t2). Then, µ1 =5 .6335,λ 1 =1 .2578 and therefore
16h(λ1)(1 − th)2 = −4.1582 × 10−3 < 0 <h (µ1)(1 − tl)2 =3 .1208 × 10−3. This proves that for
suﬃciently large cost diﬀerences Assignment 1 is an equilibrium. Similarly, it is easy to prove that
when the cost asymmetry between the ﬁrms is large, Assignment 2 is not an equilibrium. We omit
this proof to economize on space.
In the second part of the proof we apply the risk-dominance criterion of Harsany and Selten
(1988) to show that Assignment 1 is the unique reﬁned equilibrium if and only if c1/(1 − t1) >
c2/(1 − t2). Again, consider ﬁrst Assignment 1. This is the case fully developed in the main body
of the paper. In this candidate equilibrium, product diﬀerentiation is given by the solution to (3)
and demands, qualities and prices obtain from (4)-(7). Consider now Assignment 2. In this case a
new candidate equilibrium can be derived following exactly the same steps outlined in Section 3.





4(4µ2 − 3µ +2 )
. (18)
We note that equations (3) and (18) are equal except for the LHS; therefore, they yield diﬀerent
solutions. Let e µ denote the solution to (18). Under Assignment 2, ﬁrm 1 (the most ineﬃcient)
produces high quality given by
e qh =( 1− t1)
4θe µ(4e µ2 − 3e µ +2 )
c1 (4e µ − 1)
3 (19)
while ﬁrm 1 produces low quality given by
e ql =( 1− t2)
θe µ2(4e µ − 7)
c2 (4e µ − 1)
3. (20)
Given any pair of tariﬀs( t1,t 2), ﬁrms must choose between Assignment 1 and 2. This choice is
represented in the following matrix:
3Firm 2
qh e ql
Firm 1 ql πl(qh,q l),πh(qh,q l) πl(e ql,q l),πh(e ql,q l)
e qh πl(qh, e qh),πh(qh, e qh) πh(e qh, e ql),πl(e qh, e ql)
where πl(e ql,q l) and πh(e ql,q l) denote the payoﬀst oﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2, respectively, when the former
chooses to produce the low-quality given by Assignment 1 and the latter chooses to produce the
low-quality given by Assignment 2. Payoﬀs πl(qh, e qh) and πh(qh, e qh) are similarly interpreted.
Let G11 = πl(qh,q l) − πl(qh, e qh) be the gains ﬁrm 1 obtains by predicting correctly that ﬁrm 2
will choose Assignment 1. Likewise, G12 = πh(e qh, e ql) − πl(e ql,q l) denotes the gains ﬁrm 1 derives
by forecasting correctly that ﬁrm 2 will select Assignment 2. Similarly, for ﬁrm 2 we have G21 =
πh(qh,q l) − πh(e ql,q l) and G22 = πl(e qh, e ql) − πh(qh, e qh). It is said that Assignment 1 risk-dominates
Assignment 2 whenever G11G21 >G 12G22.
Unfortunately, the theoretical application of this criterion to our game is diﬃcult because the
solution to equations (3) and (18) —and by implication the maximizers of πl(qh,q l),π h(qh,q l),
πl(e ql,q l),π h(e ql,q l) πl(qh, e qh),π h(qh, e qh) πh(e qh, e ql) and πl(e qh, e ql)— cannot be obtained explicitly.
Thus, we have chosen to solve our model numerically for several values of the ratio c1(1−t2)/c2(1−
t1). Figure 5 depicts the gains G11,G 21,G 12 and G22 as a function of this ratio.
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Inequality G11G21 >G 12G22 can be evaluated by observing Figure 6. This graph shows G11G21
and G12G22 as a function of relative costs. It can be seen that G11G21 >G 12G22 if and only if
4relative costs are greater than 1. This implies that Assignment 2 is ruled out whenever domestic
ﬁrm is (relatively) less eﬃcient than foreign ﬁrm. Otherwise, assignment 1 is selected away. We
have conducted a number of simulations with diﬀerent polynomial cost functions and the selection
criterion remains valid.
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